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I  am  very  glad  to speak  to you  today  about  trade  relations  between  the world's 
major  trading partners  in  today 1s  difficult  times.  I  shall  concentrate on  what 
we  in  Brussels  consider at present our  major  problems  - that  is our  relations 
with  Japan  and  the  United  States. 
Because  today  international  trade  is  a  reality to an  audience  like yours  in  a  way 
which  30  years  ago  it was  not.  More  than  20%  of  US  industrial" production  is  now 
exported.  Farm  produce  from  two  of every  five  acres  in  US  agriculture  is  sold 
abroad.  One  of every  six jobs  in  the  US  manufacturing sector  is  created by  exports. 
And  almost  one  of every  three dollars  of  US  corporate profit derives  from  the  inter-
national  trade  and  investment  activities  of  American  firms.  Every  American  family 
and  every  American  farm  has  a  stake  in  i nternat iona 1 trade.  So  you  wi  11  know  the 
picture  is  bleak.  Let  me  tell  you  just how  bleak  it  is. 
The  present state of world  trade  is  at  its  gloomiest  since  the war.  In  volume 
terms  aggregate world  trade stagnated  in  1981.  It  rose  by  only  1%  in  1980.  In 
that year  cyclical  downswings  in  the  major  industrial  countries  superimposed  on  the 
lower  long  term  growth  path  since  the early  1970s  and  the oil  price  increases, 
combined  to make  the  g·rowth  and  the  volume  of world production  and  world  trade  to 
the  third  lowest  gains  in  a  quarter of a  century.  And  it  is  clear  that at present 
economic  levels  the  industrial  countries will  not  attain a  rate of economic  growth 
sufficient permanently  to  reduce  unemployment.  Both  in  the  Community  and  in  the 
United  States  there  is  some  hope  starting  in  the  second  half of this year  for  a 
marginal  increase  in  GOP.  But  unemployment  in  the  Community  is  now  approaching 
11  million  and  is  likely  to  remain  remorselessly  high.  40%  of these  unemployed 
are  under 25.  And  all  this  means  not only  a  dangerously  stagnant situation  in 
relation  to world  trade  but protectionist  pressures  and  strains - in all  the  major 
trading countries of  the world- on  the  social  fabric which  imperil  the  open  world 
trading system on  which  the prosperity of  the  free world  has  been  built since  the 
war. 
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It is  against  that background  that at  meetings  over  the  next  few  months  a  number 
of world  trading  nations  are getting  together  to  consider  these economic  problems. 
The  Versailles  Summit  at  the  beginning of June will  bring  together  the  United 
States,  Canada,  Japan,  four  Member  States of the  Community,  and  the  Commission-
which  acts  for  the  Community  in  trade matters  - and  the  Presidency  of  the  Council 
of  the  Community.  And  in  November  this year,  in  Geneva,  the  GATT,  the  body  which 
writes  and  polices  the  rule of  law  in  world  trade,  will  be  holding  its first 
Ministerial  meeting  since  1973;  between  80  and  90  trade ministers will  be  there. 
It would  not  be  realistic to  think  that one  or  two  meetings  can  solve  the  trade 
problems  of  the world.  And  the  Versailles  Summit  will  have  wider  problems.  But 
in  the  trade  field we  must  hope  that  the  GATT  Ministerial  meeting  is  also a  success. 
A failure at the end of the year for  the  trading  nations  of  the world  to agree on 
major  points  would  signal  the  end  of the broad  consensus  on  an  open  world  trading 
system which  has  prevailed since  the war  and  eould mark  the  beginning of  reversion 
to  the  protectionism- with  all  its political  consequences- of  the  1930s. 
What  are  the  prospects.  Three  elements  seem  to  us  essential  if we  are  going  to 
have  a  success  in  Geneva  by  the end of the year. 
First  the  problems  arising  in  trade  and  economic  relations  between  Japan  and  its 
partners  and  which  spring  from  an  insufficient  interpenetration of  the  Japanese 
economy  into the  Western  economic  system.  We  need  to  have  got  to the stage where 
there  is  some  real  prospect  of a  major opening  up  of  the  Japanese  market  and  some 
res1traint  certainly  for  the  time  being  in  the  Japanese  exports  pouring  into  some 
of  the sensitive sectors of our markets. 
Second,  there  needs  to be  some  pause  in  the escalating trade conflicts  between 
the  European  Community  and  the  United  States  notably on  steel  and  agriculture. 
Third,  economic  activity  in  the  main  industrialized  countries  needs  to  revive.  A 
rising tide,  said President  Kennedy,  lifts all  boats.  The  lift will  not  be  enough 
as  yet  to  deal  with  the  problem of unemployment.  But without  some  beginning,even 
modest,of a  rising tide  few  would  bet  on  the  harbour  lasting much  longer. 
Let  me  take  these  problems  one  by  one.  The  problems  of  the  Community- and  may 
add  the  United  States- with  Japan  are ascribed  from  time  to  time  by  Japanese 
commentators  to workshy  Europeans  and  Americans  facing efficient Japanese 
competition,  to  sheer protectionism,  to  a  reluctance  to  adjust.  The  picture  in 
rea 1i ty  is  a  different one.  The  Community's  problems  with  Japan  stern  from  a 
combination of  three  factors.  Each  on  its own  would  be  of  limited  import.  Taken 
together,  like  the  chemicals  in a  dangerous  combination,  they  can  create an 
explosion. 
The  first  is  the  size of our bilateral  deficit with  Japan.  In  1963,  the  ten  present 
members  of the  European  Community  had  a  trivial  8  million  dollar deficit with  Japan. 
This  rocketed  to some  500  million  in  1970,  to  3.4  billion  in  1975  and  14  billion  in 
1981. 
At  the  same  time  Japanese exports  to Europe  in  certain highly  sensitive areas  like 
automobiles,  colour  television  tubes  and  sets, and  certain highly  developed  machine 
tools  rose  massively. 
At  the  same  time  European  business  found  it difficult year  in year out to penetrate 
the  Japanese market. 
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Taken  in  isolation,  these  factors  are  not  all  in  themselves  decisive.  We  run 
bilateral  surpluses  and  deficits  in  turn  with  our  trading partners.  But  taken 
together,  a  massive  and  increasing deficit,  increasing  inroads  on  our sensitive 
industries  and  a  sense  that our manufacturers  cannot  get  into  the  Japanese  market 
to  the  same  extent as  they  can  get  into other  industrialized countries of the 
world  creates an  increasingly  dangerous  climate. 
Let  me  give just a  few  figures  to support what  I  have  said. 
Total  Japanese  exports  of manufactured  goods  in  1960  amounted  to 3 billion dollars. 
In  1981  the  figure  had  soared  to  136  billion dollars.  But  Japanese  imports of 
manufactures  in  1960  at just under  1 bi 11 ion  dollars  had  risen  in  1981  to only 
2  8  b i 11 i on  do 11 a rs • 
Again  in  1980  the  European  Community  imported  manufactured products  equal  to just 
under  800  dollars  per head.  The  figure  for  the  United  States was  547  dollars,  the 
figure  for  Japan  was  233.  Thus  Japan's  imports  of  manufactured  goods  are  about 
the  same  value as  those of  Swlt~erland, an  economy  one-tenth of that of Japan. 
And  in  per capita  terms  Japan  is  next  to  last among  Member  States  of  the  OECD.  The 
percentage of total  Imports  represented by  manufactured  goods  is equally striking -
55%  in  the  case of the  United  States,  46.5%  in  the  case of  the  Community  - only 
22%  in  the  case of Japan. 
These  fl gures  demonstrate  more  dearly  than  any  long  argument  the  size of an 
imbalance  which  is  putting an  increasing strain on  the world  trading system. 
We  have  therefore over a  period of years  pressed  the  Japaneseauthori ties  to  take 
action  in  a  number  of areas.  We  have  asked  for an  easement  of tariffs,  fiscal 
charges  and  quotas,  of what  we  consider  to  be  very  restrictive standards  and 
testing and  acceptance procedures  as  well  as  improvements  in  the  conditions  for 
financial  services  and  investments. 
We  have  asked  the  Japanese  to provide  tangible  assurances  that  from  1982  onwards 
Japan  wi  11  pursue  a  policy of effective moderation  towards  the  European  Community 
as  a  whole  as  regards  Japanese exports  in sectors where  an  increase  in  Japanese 
exports  to  the  Community  would  cause  significant problems,  notably  passenger cars, 
colour  television sets and  tubes,  and  certain machine  tools.  And  more  broadly,  we 
have  emphasized  that  the essential  argument  concerns  the need  for  Japan  to open  up 
its market.  This  relates  to  the effect of Japanese  trading and  economic  policies 
as  a  whole  and  the  need  to achieve  a  more  balanced  integration- commensurate  with 
Japan's  in te mat  iona 1  res  pons i b i 1 It  i es  - of  the  Japanese  economy  with  that of  its 
main  industrialized partners  and  notably with  the  European  Community. 
With  this  in  mind,  we  have  recently  taken  action  to consult with  Japan  under  the 
"nullification and  impairment"  provisions of  the  GATT.  We  have  thus  given  notice 
that  if no  satisfactory adjustment  can  be  effected  between  us  within  a  reasonable 
period of  time  then  we  shall  need  to consider proceeding  to take  the  matter for 
adjudication  to  the  Contracting Parties of  the  GATT.  This  will  provide  the  GATT 
with one  of its  biggest  postwar  tests.  But  we  are  faced with one  of  the  biggest 
postwar  problems  of the world  trading system.  As  some  senior visiting Japanese 
politicians were  recently  told  fn  Brussels  "the  regrettable  fact  is  that  the  EEC 
now  has  trade problems  with  Japan  of sufficient seriousness  to  compromise  the 
overall  economic  and  political  relationship  between  us.  If we  cannot  solve our 
trade problems  or at any  rate  render  them  less  acute  then our efforts  to  restore 
prosperity  and  growth  to our domestic economies  and  to  the  free world  as  a whole 
will  be  substantially set back.  More  than  this,  the  tensions  now  prevailing  in 
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relations with  Japan,  not  only  in  Europe  but  also  in  the  US,  risk precipitating 
the  end  of  the  free world  trading system as  we  have  known  it  in  the  postwar 
years". 
Now  let me  turn  to another sombre  picture.  Trade  relations  between  the  Community 
and  the  United  States.  There  are  differences  between  us  in  a  number  of areas-
export  credits,  interest  rates,  East-West  trade.  But  the  main  areas  of difference 
at present  relate  to steel  and  agriculture. 
On  steel  we  are clear  that  the  US  steel  industry  has  launched  a  massive  campaign 
of harassment  against  European  exporters.  The  trading  rules  do  not  declare 
dumping  illegal.  What  is  at  issue  is whether  dumping  to the extent  it exists  is 
causing material  injury  to  the  US  steel  industry.  That  is  where  the  rules  bite. 
We  think  that any  such  claim  is  moonshine.  The  share of  the  American  market  for 
Coal  and  Steel  Community  products  in  1981  was  4.7%  compared  with  6.7%  in  1979. 
Yet  on  January  11  four  trucks  containing over a  million  documents  drew  up  outside 
the  lTC  Headquarters  and  85  suits were  launched  against  European  steel  markets. 
We  said at  the  time  that  these suits were  enormously  strong on  allegations  and 
incredibly weak  on  evidence.  There were  companies  against  which  allegations were 
made  who  never export  the  product  cited  for  the  good  reason  that  they  never 
produce  it.  There  were  people who  had  exported  450  tons.  Is  it conceivable  that 
450  tons  can  cause  a  problem?  In  the  case of one  product,  hot  rolled  carbon  sheet, 
Community  exports  represented  0.31%  of  the  US  market.  In  the  case of  cold  rolled 
carbon  strip 0.35%.  Who  do  you  think  is  kidding whom? 
It  is  true  that  the  lTC  rejected  a  number  of these  cases  in  February.  But  the 
remaining  cases still  account  for  some  four-fifths  of  the  volume  covered  by  the 
full  number.  And  of course  as  this  timetable  rolls  on  this  massive  campaign  of 
harassment  is  bound  to have  results  in  terms  of withholding of  appraisement  and 
consequent  reluctance,  given  the  uncertainties  involved,  of  importers  to  import. 
All  this  threatens  trade of some  5-6  mi  Ilion  tons,  worth  some  2  bi Ilion dollars  a 
year.  And  to this  should  be  added  another  recently  launched  action  under  Section 
301  against  Member  States on  speciality steel. 
So  much  for one  major  area  where  grave  consequences  are  threatened  by  US  action 
for  trade  across  the  Atlantic.  Let  me  turn  to  another  - agri cui ture.  Now  here 
we  should  be  clear  from  the outset  that  there  can  be  no  reasonable  charge  that 
the  Community  is  a  protectionist  bloc.  The  EEC  remains  the  biggest  importer of 
agricultural  products  in  the world.  In  1980  we  took  a  quarter of world agricultural 
imports  and  we  had  a  trade  deficit  in  agriculture of nearly  29  billion dollars. 
The  trade  deficit of  the  EEC  in  agriculture with  the  US  increased  in  fact  from 
5.8 billion dollars  in  1979  to 6.8 billion dollars  in  1980.  That was  an  increase 
of  17%  and  in  the  first  nine  months  of  1981  it continued  to  increase  by  13%. 
An  argument  has  recently  developed on  our  imports  from  the  United States  of  corn 
gluten  feed.  Here  all  we  have  proposed  to our  Council  is  that  we  open 
consultations with  the  United  States  on  the  possibility of  temporarily  levelling 
on  rapidly  spiralling  imports  from  the  US  in  return  for  compensation  as  provided 
for  by  the  GATT  procedures. 
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In  fact  most  of  the  argument  between  us  is  not  about  imports  into  the  EC.  It 
is  about exports  from  the  EEC  to third markets.  And  here  there  is  a  basic 
difference of perception.  Your  authorities  say  agricultural  subsidies  are  bad 
and  must  be  removed.  We  say  that  this  is  not what  the  international  trading 
rules  provide.  The  agreement  come  to after long  and difficult negotiations 
in  the Tokyo  Round  in  1979  confirmed  and  elaborated a  long  standing  rule  that 
agricultural  subsidies are permitted providing  that  these  did not  lead  to any 
Member  of  the  GATT  obtaining more  than  an  equitable share of world  trade. 
How  has  this worked  out?  First  it should  be  borne 
only  ones  who  give  government  aid  to our  farmers. 
from  the  US  we  find  comparisons  which  suggest  that 
the  EEC  is  40%  higher than  that  provided by  the  US 
in  mind  that we  are  not  the 
In  many  official  documents 
the  cost of  farm  support  in 
Government  to  its farmers. 
But  such  comparisons  mean  nothing.  It really  is  almost  impossible  to  get a 
precise  idea of  the  financial  support provided by  governments  for agriculture. 
You  have  to estimate not only  the  direct  budget support but all  the  direct  and 
indirect transfers  of  resources  to the  farm sector- not  just budget  subs.idies, 
in  other words,  but  also policies affecting  land,  production  costs,  direct and 
indirect  taxation,  transport  costs  and  so on- and  in  relation  to  the  USA 
spending  from  State budgets  as  well  as  from  the  Federal  budget.  If you  compare 
budget  spending on  agriculture with  the  value  added  of the agricultural  industry 
you  will  find  that  in  1976-78  the  ratio  in  the EEC  was  39.2%  and  in  the  US  it was 
37.6%.  In  our  view  if you  COllllare  like with  like  the  conclusion  must  be  that 
farm  spending  in  the  EEC  is of the same  order of magnitude  as  in  the  US. 
So,  as  seen  by  the  Republican  Party,  we  are  both  sinners  in  the  eyes  of  the  Lord. 
Having  said this what  has  happened  then  to our shares  of world  trade?  Mr.  Block 
complained  to  the  Foreign  Agricultural  Pol icy  Subcommittee of the Senate  Committee 
on  Agriculture on  Deceni>er  16  last year  that 
11subsidies  have  helped  to  push  EC 
wheat  exports  to  14  million  tons,  double  their wheat  exports  three years  ago, 
with  a  depressing effect on  world  prfces''·  Yes,  it is  true  that  Community  exports 
doubles  between  1969-70  and  1980-81  to  14  million  tons.  But  world  trade was 
expanding even  more  rapidly.  Our  share actually  fell  from  16.6%  to  14.9%  over 
this  period.  What  happened  to  US  exports?  They  did  not  just double.  They  rose 
from  16.5  mi  Ilion  tons  to no  less  than  41.9 million  tons- from  38.4%  of world 
trade  to no  less  than  44.8%  of the world  market.  Indeed  thirteen years  ago  the 
United  States  exported  40%  of their production- now  this  amounts  to between  60 
and  70%.  Let  me  take poultry.  Community  exports  in  1978  took  54.2%  and  in  1980 
54.3%.  US  exports over  the  same  period  remained  broadly  static.  And  in  respect 
of total  world agricultural  exports  between  1973  and  1980  EC  agricultural  exports 
rose  marginally  from  9.5%  to  11.1%;  US  exports  fell  marginally  19.8%  to  18.9%· 
In  the  United  Kingdom  lawyers  used  to talk about  the  fount of commonsense  legal 
wisdom  resting with  the  men  on  a  Clapham  omnibus.  I  think  they would  have 
difficulty  in concluding  from  these  figures  that  the  Community  was  using 
agricultural  subsidies  to  take  an  unfair share of world agricultural  trade. 
Let  me  go  on  to put  it another way.  After  the hard  fought  agreement  we  reached 
in  the  Tokyo  Round  about 
11an  equitable  share of the world  market
11  can  we  in 
Brussels  go  back  to our  farmers  when  the world market  for  a  certain product  is 
doubling or trebling and  say  to them  that  they  cannot  increase  their exports 
because  thi~ might  inconvenience  farmers  elsewhere?  If you  believe  that,  as  the 
Duke  of We 11 i ngton  said,  you  can  be 1  i eve  anything. 
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And  let  us  talk not  only  about  the  past.  For  the  future  the  EEC  intends  to 
continue  and  intensify  its efforts  to  rationali'ze  its  agriculture.  Our  under-
lying  aim  domestically  is  to put more  and more  responsibility on  farmers  them-
selves  to dispose  of surpluses  especially  by  making  the  farmers  contribute  to 
the  cost  of  s-urplus  disposal.  Not  that we  consider an  excess of domestic 
production over domestic consumption is  necessarily  a  surplus  that  must  be 
eliminated.  The  EEC  intends  to keep  its  place  in world  trade.  But  we  consider 
that  for  some  products  the  European  Community's  price  guarantees  to  its  farmers 
should  no  longer be  unlimited but  graduated.  We  have  this  system already  fully 
in  force  for  sugar and  in part  for  milk  products.  And  for  cereals we  intend  to 
fix "production  thresholds"  in  terms  of quantity  for our  cereals  for  the  1980s. 
This  means  that if the  threshold  is  exceeded  then  in  the  following year  the  level 
of support will  be  diminished. 
So  much  for  some  elements  of  the  record  and  some  guidelines we  are  following  for 
the  future.  What  has  been  the  United States  reaction  to all  this?  I  would 
divide  it under  four  heads.  In  the first place  a  whole  number  of separate  cases 
have  been  brought  for  adjudication  to  the  GATT  by  the  United  States  -wheat  flour, 
sugar,  poultry,  pasta,  canned  fruit,  and  citrus.  You  might  say  why  not?  If 
there  is  adjudication  in  the  GATT  let  it take  its  normal  course.  But  in  the 
first place  these  cases  each  require  lengthy  and  detailed debate.  In  the  second 
place  this  concentration of cases  is  not only  unparalleled;  it risks  blowing  the 
dispute  settlement process  in  the  GATT  and  with  it the  rule of  law  in world  trade 
just as  certainly as  overloading with  too  many  bulbs  an  electric circuit.  A 
desire  for maximum  illumination  does  not  mean  that  you  want  the  lights  to  go  out. 
Secondly,  the  attitude of the  US  authorities  to  the  GATT  seems  to an  outsider 
somewhat  uncertain.  With  the  cases  I  have  mentioned,  they  seem  to attest  the 
validity of the  GATT,  even  while  overloading  the  circuit.  At  the  same  time,  as 
far  as  the  provisions  of  the  Subsidies  Code  negotiated  in  the  Tokyo  Round  are 
concerned- with  which  no  senior official  now  in  Washington  has  any  first  hand 
experience- they  seem  somewhat  less  than  certain.  Mr.  Brock  said  on  February  11 
to  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Trade of the  Senate  Finance  Committee  that 
if  the  EEC  Commission  is  found  by  GATT  to be  in  the wrong,  the  EEC  will  change  its 
policy.  If  the  US  interpretation  is  wrong  the  US  will  try  to change  the  Subsidy 
Code.  This  is  what  is  known  in  the  Queen's  English as  "heads  I win,  tails  you 
lose". 
Again,  you  will  know  that  the  Commission  has  recently  proposed  to  the  Counci 1 of 
Ministers  in  Brussels  that  the  Community  start consultations with  the  United 
States  under  Article  XXVI  I I of  the  GATT  to  level  off the  soaring exports  from  the 
United  States  of  corn  gluten  feed  to  the  Community- in  return  for  due 
compensation.  An  official  statement  I  have  here  by  the  Public Affairs  Office of 
the  US  Mission  totheEuropean  Communities  says,  "US  says  corn  gluten  duty  not 
negotiable".  This  is  simply  not  in accordance  with  GATT  procedures.  Inter-
national  trade  rules  provide  that negotiation  must  be  engaged;  the  compensation 
then  offered needs  to  be  the  subject of agreement.  But  negotiation  cannot  be 
refused. 
One  further  example.  A statement of  US  views  on  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
handed  to  us  and  widely  distributed  to  Congress  in  February  this  year said, 
"the  US  cannot  tolerate  the  evolution of the  CAP  to  a  common  export  policy  ... 
EEC  export subsidies  are  the  single most  harmful  of  EC  policies.  The  US  must 
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seek  an  acceptable  plan  and  timetable  for  their elimination".  All  this  goes 
a milHon miles  beyond  what  was  negotiated  in  the Tokyo  Round  when  not only 
the  United  States and  the  Conrnun tty as  two  countries  wh l ch  subs i d 1  ze  the  i r 
agriculture  to a  comparable  degree  agreed  together with  nearly  80  other 
Contracting Parties on  the  "equitable share of the world  market" as  the 
I imi ting  factor. 
A third point  is  the  tone  of voice  adopted  by  the  US  Administration.  And  this 
was  set by  Agriculture Secretary  Block  before  the  House  Agricultural  Committee 
on  18  February when  he  said- and  I quote- "my  Department  is  working 
aggressively  to stimulate  long-term growth  of exports of  US  farm  products". 
Anyone  could  understand a  Cabinet  member's  wish  to boost  the products  for which 
he  is  responsible.  But  what  worries  us  is  this  constant  use  of the word 
aggressive  not  just  in  this but  many  other statements.  Mr.  Block  went  on  to 
say  that 
1'we  are  going  to  do  battle with  the  EEC  for ever and  whenever  it  is 
necessary••. 
I  find  it difficult not  to  be  reminded  of  Mark  Twain  talking about  Carlyle  and 
the  Americans  "at bottom he  was  probably  fond  of  them  but  he  was  always  able  to 
conceal  it". 
Fourthly  there  are  pressures on  the part of  the  US  Administration  to change  and 
broaden  the  rules of world  trade  in  agricultural  products.  This  we  find 
surprising.  For  it  is  the  United States which  do  not fully  apply  the  GATT 
rules  on  agriculture.  Since  1955  the  so-called  GATT  waiver has  allowed you  to 
ignore  certain  rules of the GATT- to be  precise,notwithstanding any  provision 
of the  GATT,  the  United States  can  impose  what  controls  it  likes on  inter alia 
imports  of cotton,  sugar,  peanuts,  and  dairy  products.  The  EEC  benefits  from 
no  such  provision.  And  I  mention  only  in  passing  the  DISC  system  in  force  since 
1972- which  we  consider a  clear export subsidy  not  to be  applied  to exports of 
non  primary  products- exports  under Section  1 of P.L.480,  the  government  to 
government  agreements  on  milk  products  and  the  US  method  of applying  drawback 
for sugar- all  of which  we  do  not  consider compatible with  the  rules of  GATT. 
Those  who  want  to  change the rules  in any  particular game  should  at  least  take 
care  that  they  are  accepting  them  and  observing  them. 
It  is  difficult  to avoid  on  the  European  side  drawing  two  general  conclusions 
from  the  facts  I  have  set out.  The  first  is  that  there  is  an  attempt  to shift 
the  blame  for certain difficult conditions  in  the  United  States  to  foreigners  in 
general  and  Europeans  in particular.  The  US  steel  industry  is  going  through  a 
difficult time.  Like  steel  industries  elsewhere  - and  in  this  the  US  industry  is 
not  unique- there  has  been  inadequate  investment,  rationalization,  modernization. 
All  of you  know  that  the  troubles of  the  US  steel  industry  do  not  in any 
substantial  way  come  from  European  steel  exports  - these  represent  Jess  than  5% 
of  the  total  US  steel  market,  and  ludicrously  small  in  the  case  of particular 
products.  But  the  OECD  steel  consensus  of  1977 provided  that the  burden  of 
restructuring should  be  shared equally  on  both  sides of the Atlantic.  This  is 
what  the  US  steel  industry  is  now  trying  to  throw  into the waste  paper  basket. 
Again,  on  US  agriculture all of you  know  that the  deep  troubles of  US  agriculture 
can  be  ascribed to a  variety of causes:  interest  rates  - total  farm  debt  has 
soared  to 200  billion dollars meaning  that  the  average  farmer owes  10  dollars 
for every  dollar he  earned,  five  times  more  than  the  historical  rate- growing 
American  agricultural  surpluses,  a  strengthening  doJJar  and  a  fall  in  the  US 
share of  Soviet  grain  imports  since  the embargo  from  75%  to  40%.  Certainly 
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competition  in  third markets  has  p 1  ayed  a  part.  But  the  Community  cannot  and 
wi 11  not  accept  that  its  farmers  do  not  have  a  dght  to make  a  1 iving selling 
overseas  providing  they  abide by  the  international  trading  rules.  The 
Community  is  not  prepared  to be  a  scapegoat  for  the difficulties of  US 
agriculture. 
The  second  general  conclusion  is  this.  A rule of  law  depends  nationally or 
internationally on  those  in  authority  being prepared  to spell  out what  the 
rules  are  for  better or for worse.  No  Sheriff  in  a  Western  town  ever  told 
everybody  that  the  law  would  always  be  100%  in  his,,.favour  in  any  circumstance. 
Nor  nONadays  does  your  lawyer.  In  the  Communltywehad  a  case  18  months  ago 
where  there was  massive  pressure  for  import  restrictions  to be  placed on 
American  exports  of  petroleum chemical  products  because of  the  artificially 
low  price in  the United  States  for natural  gas  and  the  consequent  fierce 
competition on  the  European  market.  On  this  the  Commission  of the European 
Communities  stuck  to  its  guns.  We  explained  that  there were  not  clear cut 
provisions  in  the  GATT  which  could effectively tackle  this  particular problem-
unless  material  injury  could  be  effectively  shown  - and  it was  not.  This  made 
us  very  unpopular.  We  were  told  that  the existing world  trade  rules  were  less 
than  perfect.  But  they were  the only  rules  we  had.  It  is  not  to  us  apparent 
that  the  United  States Administration  is  quite  as  ready  to explain  the  rules 
of  the world  trading  system  in  quite  this  even  handed  form.  But  unless  we  all 
of us  do  this with our  clients  it will  become  more  and  more  difficult to  keep 
what  in  the  West  you  used  to oall 
11peace  in  the  valley'•. 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  tried  to set out  today  a  Community  view  of some  of the 
tensions  now  straining world  trade.  Our  hope  would be- and we  shall  join  in 
it  from  the  Community  in  good  faith- that  the  series of meetings  we  have  over 
the  rest  of  this  year,  our bilateral  contacts  and  our meetings  in  the  GATT, 
can  contribute  to  resolving  these  key  difficulties.  If we  do  not,then what 
is at risk  is  simply  the world  trading system which  has  been  responsible over 
the  last  30  years  for  the  biggest  increase of prosperity  in  the  free world 
ever  recorded.  The  stakes  are  so  high  that we  must  succeed.  This  wi  11  require 
much  courage,  much  effort and  very  cool  heads.  But  we  cannot  afford  to fail. 